UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

11-19-2008

State v. Ciccone Respondent's Brief Dckt. 32179

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"State v. Ciccone Respondent's Brief Dckt. 32179" (2008). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 2428.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/2428

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO"
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff·Respondent,
vs.
ALBERT A. CICCONE,

L...l_)_ _......1
NO. 3217.9

FILED ~ COpy
HOV , 92008

)

Defendant·Appellant.

-------------)

OPY

Supreme,Court_courtotAppeals

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _--':--"~...!'I.r.donATSbY:= -

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF ELMORE

HONORABLE MICHAEL E. WETHERELL
District Judge

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
STEPHEN A. BYWATER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division

ERIK R. LEHTINEN
Deputy State Appellate
Public Defender
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334·2712

LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720·0010
(208) 334·4534
ATTORNEYS FOR
PLAINTIFF·RESPONDENT

ATTORNEY FOR
DEFENDANT·APPELLANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................. iv
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................... 1
Nature of the Case ..................................................................................... 1
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings ........................................ 1
ISSUES ................................................................................................................. 4
ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................... 5
I.

II.

This Court Is Without Jurisdiction To Entertain Ciccone's
Appeal Because Ciccone Failed To Timely File His Notice
Of Appeal From The Original Judgment Of Conviction ................... 5
A.

Introduction ........................................................................... 5

B.

Standard Of Review .............................................................. 5

C.

Ciccone's Appeal Is Untimely And Must Be Dismissed ........ 6

The District Court Correctly Applied The Law To The
Facts In Concluding That Ciccone Failed To Establish A
Violation Of Either His Statutory Or Constitutional
Speedy Trial Rights ....................................................................... 11
A.

Introduction ......................................................................... 11

B.

Standard Of Review ............................................................ 11

C.

The District Court Correctly Applied The Law
To The Facts In Concluding That Good Cause
Existed To Continue The Trial Beyond The
Six-Month Statutory Speedy Trial Period Of
I.C. § 19-3501 .................................................................... 12

D.

The District Court Correctly Applied The Law
To The Facts In Concluding That Ciccone Failed
To Establish A Violation Of His Constitutional
Speedy Trial Rights ............................................................ 19

III.

IV.

V.

1.

The Length Of The Delay, While Sufficient
To Trigger Balancing, Does Not Weigh In
Ciccone's Favor ....................................................... 20

2.

The Unavailability Of The State's Witnesses
Constituted A Valid Reason For The Delay ............. 22

3.

Ciccone Did Not Timely Assert His Constitutional
Speedy Trial Rights .................................................. 23

4.

Ciccone Failed To Establish That He Was
Unfairly Prejudiced By The Delay ............................ 24

5.

A Balancing Of The Barker Factors Weighs
Against A Finding Of A Speedy Trial Violation ......... 25

Ciccone Is Not Entitled To Relief On Any Of His Prosecutorial
Misconduct Claims ........................................................................ 26

A.

Introduction ......................................................................... 26

B.

Standard Of Review And General Legal Standards
Governing Claims Of Prosecutorial Misconduct ................. 26

C.

Ciccone Is Not Entitled To Relief On Either Of
His Allegations That The Prosecutor Engaged In
Misconduct By Commenting On His Silence ...................... 28

D.

The Prosecutor's Reference To Kathleen's Death
As A Tragedy And His Request For Justice Did Not
Constitute Misconduct ........................................................ 35

Ciccone Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of The
District Court's Sentencing Discretion ........................................... 38

A.

Introduction ......................................................................... 38

B.

Standard Of Review ............................................................ 38

C.

Ciccone Has Failed To Establish That The Fixed
Life Sentence Imposed Upon His Conviction For
The First Degree Murder Of His Pregnant Wife Is
Excessive Under Any Reasonable View Of The Facts ....... 39

Ciccone Has Failed To Establish A Violation Of His Due
Process Rights On Appeal ............................................................ 45

ii

CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 48
CERTIFICATE OF SERViCE .............................................................................. 48

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
PAGE

CASES

Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) ........................................................ passim
Bell v. State, 651 S.E.2d 218 (Ga. App. 2007) ............................................. 15,19
Commonwealth v. Hyland, 875 A.2d 1175 (Pa. 2005) ............................ 15, 18, 19
Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986) ................................................. 26,29
Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992) ............................................. 18,22
Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974) ........................................... 28, 33
Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963) ...................................................... .47
Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. of Prison Terms and Paroles,
357 U.S. 214 (1958) .................................................................... ..47
Griffin v.lllinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) .................................................................. .47
H & V Engineering, Inc. v. Idaho State Bd. of Professional
Engineers and Land Surveyors, 113 Idaho 646,
747 P.2d 55 (1987) .......................................................................... 5
Kelley v. Commonwealth, 439 S.E.2d 616 (Va. App. 1994) ......................... 15, 19
Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963) .................................................................. .47
Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982) ................................................................ 27
State v. Avila, 143 Idaho 849, 153 P.3d 1195 (Ct. App. 2006) ................... passim
State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 38 P.3d 614 (2001) ..................................... 38, 39
State v. Brown, 131 Idaho 61,951 P.2d 1288 (Ct. App. 1998) ........................... 35
Statev. Campbell, 104 Idaho 705, 662 P.2d 1149 (Ct. App. 1983) .................... 21
State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255, 16 P.3d 931 (2000) ..................................... passim
State v. Cortez, 135 Idaho 561,21 P.3d 498 (Ct. App. 2001) ............................ 35

iv

State v. Davis, 141 Idaho 828, 118 P.3d 160 (Ct. App. 2005) .................... passim
State v. Estes, 111 Idaho 423,725 P.2d 128 (1986) .......................................... 28
State v. Eubank, 114 Idaho 635,759 P.2d 926 (Ct. App. 1988) ........................ .40
State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559,165 P.3d 273 (2007) ........................................... 28
State v. Fuller, 104 Idaho 891, 665 P.2d 190 (Ct. App. 1983) .............................. 6
State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 988 P.2d 1170 (1999) .................................... 27
State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 768 P.2d 1331 (1989) ..................................... 40
State v. Hernandez, 133 Idaho 576,990 P.2d 742 (Ct. App. 1999) ................... 24
State v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 56, 803 P.2d 557 (Ct. App. 1990) ................... 12,13
State v. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482,80 P.3d 1083 (2003) ...................................... 5
State v. Kuhn, 139 Idaho 710, 685 P.3d 1109 (Ct. App. 2003) .......................... 35
State v. Larsen, 81 Idaho 90, 337 P.2d 1 (1959) ................................................ 37
State v. Lopez, 141 Idaho 575,114 P.3d 133 (Ct. App. 2005) ........................... 34
State v. Lopez, 144 Idaho 349, 160 P.3d 1284 (Ct. App. 2007) ................. passim
State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831,11 P.3d 27 (2000) ....................................... 39
State v. McKeeth, 136691, 38 P.3d 1275 (Ct. App. 2001) ................................. 19
State v. Payan, 128 Idaho 866,920 P.2d 82 (Ct.App. 1996) ............... 6,7,10,11
State v. Payne, _

P.3d _,2008 WL 2447447 (Idaho 2008) ........................ 29

State v. Perez, 145 Idaho 383, 179 P.3d 346 (Ct. App. 2008) ............................ 40
State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 156 P.3d 583 (Ct. App. 2007) ............................ 29
Statev. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445, 816 P.2d 1002 (Ct. App.1991) ........ 28, 29, 33
State v. Rodriguez-Perez, 129 Idaho 29,921 P.2d 206 (Ct. App. 1996) ............ 24
State v. Romero-Garcia, 139 Idaho 199, 75 P.3d 1209 (Ct. App. 2003) ............ 26

v

State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267,77 P.3d 956 (2003) ...................................... 29
State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139,191 P.3d 217 (2008) ..................................... .40
State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457,50 P.3d 472 (2002) ......................................... .47
State v. Strouse, 133 Idaho 709,992 P.2d 158 (1999) ............................ :......... 32
State v. Stuart, 113 Idaho 494, 745 P.2d 1115 (Ct. App. 1987) ............. 12, 13, 19
State v. Talmage, 104 Idaho 249,658 P.2d 920 (1983) ..................................... 21
State v. Timmons, 145 Idaho 279, 178 P.3d 644 (Ct. App. 2008) ...................... 35
State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 650 P.2d 707 (Ct. App. 1982) ......................... .40
State v. Wargi, 119 Idaho 292, 805 P.2d 498 (Ct. App. 1991) ............................. 7
State v. Young, 136 Idaho 113, 29 P.3d 949 (2001) ............................... 12, 20, 24
State v. Zaitseva, 135 Idaho 11, 13 P .3d 338 (2000) ......................................... 38
United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302 (1986) ............................................. 25
United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971) .................................................... 20
United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1 (1985) ......................................................... 27
Walton, Inc. v. Jensen, 132 Idaho 716, 979 P.2d 118 (Ct. App. 1999) ................. 7

STATUTES
I. C. § 18-4004 .....................................................................................................40
I.C. § 19-2519(a) ................................................................................................... 8
I.C. § 19-3501 ................................................................................... 12, 13, 16, 19
I.C. § 19-3506 ..................................................................................................... 19

vi

RULES
IAR. 14(a) ............................................................................................................ .
IAR. 21 .......................................................................................................... 6, 11
I.C.R. 33(b) ........................................................................................................... 8
I.C.R. 36 ...................................................................................................... 8, 9, 10
I.C.R. 49(c) ........................................................................................................... 8
I.R.C.P. 5(e) .......................................................................................................... 8
I.R.C.P. 58(a) ........................................................................................................ 8

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Article 1, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution .............................................................. 19

vii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Albert A. Ciccone attempts to appeal from the judgment and sentence
entered upon the jury verdict finding him guilty of one count of first degree
murder and one count of second degree murder. Because Ciccone failed to file
his notice of appeal within 42 days of the entry of judgment as required by I.A.R.
14, his appeal is untimely and should be dismissed. Alternatively, his conviction
and sentence should be affirmed.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
On October 16, 2003, Ciccone drove at an estimated speed of 50 miles
per hour and intentionally ran down his pregnant wife, Kathleen, as she walked
away from him following an argument. (Trial Tr., p.1112, LsA-18, p.1114, Ls.
11-18, p.1124, L.20 - p.1125, LA, p.1130, L.20 - p.1131, L.17; State's Exhibits
51, 60-63.)

The car hit Kathleen with such force that she bounced off the

windshield, launched into the air, went through a fence and slammed against a
tree 75 feet away from the point of impact. (Trial Tr., pA83, L.10 - pA85, L.19,
p.506, L.17 - p.509, L.12, p.1116, Ls.9-18.) Witnesses atthe scene immediately
called 911 and rushed to Kathleen's side. (Trial Tr., p.508, Ls.18-22, p.510, L.16
- p.511, L.22, p.513, L.24 - p.514, L.16.) Ciccone, on the other hand, got out of
his car, looked from a distance at Kathleen's lifeless body and walked away from
the scene. (Trial Tr., p.515, L.6 - p.519, L.19.)
Law enforcement and rescue personnel subsequently found Ciccone in
the desert about a mile and a half away from the crash site. (Trial Tr., p.609, L.1
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- p.611, L.19, p.669, L.6 - p.671, L.22, p.992, L.18 - p.993, L.3, p.1165, LS.813, p.1179, Ls.14-16, p.1311, L.18 -

p.1313, L.11.)

He was relatively

unscathed, did not display any physical symptoms of shock and, although he
claimed to have blacked out, had no confirmed neurological trauma. (Trial Tr.,
p.614, Ls.5-12, p.672, L.5 - p.677, L.8, p.683, L.22 - p.684, L.22, p.1166, L.5p.1167, L.4, p.1170, L.10-p.1178, L.13, p.1181, L.16-p.1182, L.9, p.1318, L.5
- p.1329, L.2.) He was treated at the hospital for a sore ankle and released the
same night to the custody of law enforcement. (Trial Tr., p.1166, L.10 - p.1167,
p.1475, L.19 - p.1476, L.14.) Kathleen suffered multiple head fractures and she
and her unborn child died at the scene. (Trial Tr., p.563, L.23 - p.565, L.21,
p.576, L.21 - p.577, L.14, p.603, L.18 - p.604, L.4, p.664, L.25 - p.667, L.10,
p.1309, Ls.1-24.)
The state charged Ciccone with two counts of first degree murder. (R.,
vol. I, pp.60-61.) Ciccone pled not guilty and the case was set for trial. (R., vol.
I, pp.62-63, 66-67.) A week before trial, the state filed a motion to continue,
asserting as the primary basis for its request that many of its witnesses were
active duty military personnel on temporary duty ("TDY") outside the state and
unavailable for trial.

(R., vol. I, pp.1 02-1 09.)

The district court granted the

motion over Ciccone's objection and reset the trial for January 7, 2005,
approximately one year after the filing of the Information. (R., vol. I, pp.114-17.)
Ciccone subsequently filed a motion to dismiss, claiming a violation of his
statutory and constitutional rights to a speedy trial. (R., vol. I, pp.168-69.) The
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district court denied the motion and the case proceeded to trial.

(R., vol. I,

pp.180-85; R., vol. II, pp.226-85.)
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Ciccone guilty of the first
degree murder of Kathleen and the second degree murder of the fetus Kathleen
was carrying when she died. (R., vol. II, pp.286-93.) Ciccone filed a motion for
judgment of acquittal and a motion for a new trial (R., vol. II, pp.295-99), both of
which the district court denied (R., vol. II, pp.323-27).

The court thereafter

imposed a fixed life sentence upon Ciccone's conviction for first degree murder
and a concurrent fixed 15-year sentence upon his conviction for second degree
murder. (R., vol. II, pp.338-41.) Judgment was entered on June 7, 2005, the
same day Ciccone was sentenced. (R., vol. II, pp.334-36, 340.) However, due
to a clerical error, the judgment was file stamped May 7, 2005.

(R., vol. II,

p.338.) The district court entered an amended judgment on June 21, 2005. (R.,
vol. II, pp.342-45.) With the exception of the dates of the file stamp and the
court's signature, the amended judgment is identical to the original judgment
signed by the court on June 7, 2005. (Compare R., vol. II, pp.338-41 with pp.
342-45.) Ciccone filed a notice of appeal on August 2, 2005 (R., vol. II, pp.34650), timely only from the amended judgment.
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ISSUES
Ciccone states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Is Mr. Ciccone's Notice of Appeal timely from the district
court's judgment of conviction?

2.

Were Mr. Ciccone's speedy trial rights violated when, on the
eve of trial, the district court granted the State's motion for a
continuance and set Mr. Ciccone's trial out an additional six
months?

3.

Did the prosecutor engage in misconduct by twice
commenting on Mr. Ciccone's silence and then asking the
jury to convict Mr. Ciccone based on sympathy for the
victim?

4.

Is Mr. Ciccone's fixed life sentence for first degree murder
excessive given any view of the facts?

5.

Has the Idaho Supreme Court denied Mr. Ciccone his right
to due process on appeal by requiring him to file this
Appellant's Brief before all of the transcripts have been
prepared?

(Appellant's brief, p.12.)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.

Is this Court without jurisdiction to consider Ciccone's appellate claims
because Ciccone failed timely file his notice of appeal from the judgment
of conviction?

2.

If this Court has jurisdiction to consider the merits of Ciccone's appeal,
has Ciccone failed to establish a violation of either his constitutional or
statutory speedy trial rights?

3.

Has Ciccone failed to show he is entitled to relief with respect to any of his
claims of prosecutorial misconduct?

4.

Has Ciccone failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion
in imposing a fixed life sentence upon his conviction for first degree
murder?

5.

Has Ciccone failed to establish a violation of his due process rights on
appeal?
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ARGUMENT
I.
This Court Is Without Jurisdiction To Entertain Ciccone's Appeal
Because Ciccone Failed To Timely File His Notice Of Appeal From
The Original Judgment Of Conviction

A.

Introduction
Ciccone asks this Court to vacate his conviction and sentence, claiming

violations of his speedy trial and due process rights and arguing that his
sentence is excessive.

(Appellant's brief, pp.13-65.)

This Court is without

jurisdiction to entertain Ciccone's appellate claims, however, because Ciccone
failed to timely file his notice of appeal from the original judgment of conviction,
and the issuance of an amended judgment, which did not alter any of the terms
that Ciccone now challenges, did not extend the jurisdictional period in which
Ciccone was required to file his appeal.
B.

Standard Of Review
'''A question of jurisdiction is fundamental; it cannot be ignored when

brought to [the appellate courts'] attention and should be addressed prior to
considering the merits of an appeal.'" State v. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482,483,80
P.3d 1083, 1084 (2003) (quoting H & V Engineering, Inc. v. Idaho State Bd. of
Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors, 113 Idaho 646, 648, 747 P.2d 55,
57 (1987)).

Whether a court has jurisdiction is a question of law, given free

review. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho at 483,80 P.3d at 1084.
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C.

Ciccone's Appeal Is Untimely And Must Be Dismissed
The Idaho Appellate Rules govern the time and manner in which appeals

to the Idaho Supreme Court are to be filed. With respect to appeals from the
district court, I.A.R. 14(a) provides:
(a) Appeals From the District Court. Any appeal as a matter of
right from the district court may be made only by physically filing a
notice of appeal with the clerk of the district court within 42 days
from the date evidenced by the filing stamp of the clerk of the court
on any judgment, order or decree of the district court appealable as
a matter of right in any civil or criminal action. ".
I.A.R. 14(a).

A timely filed notice of appeal is a prerequisite to appellate

jurisdiction. I.A.R. 21; State v. Payan, 128 Idaho 866, 920 P.2d 82 (Ct. App.
1996); State v. Fuller, 104 Idaho 891, 665 P.2d 190 (Ct. App. 1983). The failure
to file a notice of appeal within the time limits prescribed by the appellate rules
requires "automatic dismissal" of the appeal. IAR. 21.
The district court entered judgment against Ciccone on June 7, 2005, the
same day Ciccone was sentenced upon his convictions for first and second
degree murder. (R., vol. II, pp.334-36, 338-40.) However, due to a clerical error,
the judgment was file stamped May 7, 2005. (R., vol. II, p.338.) Ciccone did not
file his notice of appeal until August 2,2005 (see R., vol. II, pp.346-50) - 87 days
from the date of the erroneous file stamp and 56 days from the date the court
actually entered judgment against him. Whether the time for appeal is calculated
from the erroneous date on the file stamp or from the date the district court
actually signed the judgment, Ciccone's appeal from the judgment is not timely.
Ciccone did timely file his notice of appeal from the amended judgment of
conviction entered by the district court on June 21, 2005. (see R., vol. II, pp.342-
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45.)

Unfortunately, however, the timeliness of Ciccone's appeal from the

amended judgment does not confer jurisdiction on this Court to entertain the
issues Ciccone raises on appeal.

Entry of an amended judgment does not

necessarily "extend the period for filing an appeal or begin that period anew."
Payan, 128 Idaho at 867,920 P.2d at 83. Rather, it makes an appeal timely only
as to matters actually altered by the amended judgment. The appellate court
does not have jurisdiction to address matters unaffected by the amendments to
the judgment. Walton, Inc. v. Jensen, 132 Idaho 716, 720, 979 P.2d 118, 122
(Ct. App. 1999); Payan, 128 Idaho at 867,920 P.2d at 83.
With the exception of the dates of the file stamp and the court's signature,
the amended judgment is identical to the original judgment and did not alter any
of the terms from which Ciccone now appeals. (Compare R., vol. II, pp.338-41
with pp.342-45.)

Because Ciccone could have raised his speedy trial, due

process and excessive sentence claims upon the entry of the original judgment,
the notice of appeal, filed more than 42 days later, is untimely as to those issues.
Appellate review of Ciccone's conviction and sentence is therefore precluded.
See Payan, 128 Idaho at 867,920 at 83 (citing State v. Wargi, 119 Idaho 292,
805 P.2d 498 (Ct. App. 1991»

(direct review of judgment and sentence

precluded where original judgment contained all the terms defendant challenged,
but where appeal was timely only from amended judgment that did not alter any
of those terms).
Ciccone concedes on appeal that he did not file his notice of appeal within
42 days of the entry of the original judgment of conviction.
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(Appellant's brief,

p.13.) He also concedes that the amended judgment of conviction did not alter
any of the sUbstantive terms of the original judgment.

(Id.)

He nevertheless

asks this Court to hold that his appeal from the unaltered terms of the original
judgment is timely, contending, in essence, that: 1) the clerical error in the date
of the file stamp on the original judgment rendered that judgment void, and 2) the
"alteration" of the filing date on the amended judgment to the date the amended
judgment was actually entered somehow also altered the time in which he was
required to appeal from the original judgment. (Id., pp.13-18.) For the reasons
set forth below, both of Ciccone's arguments are without merit.
First, there is no basis in law or fact for Ciccone's claim that the clerical
error in the date of the filing stamp rendered the original judgment void. Ciccone
cites I.C. § 19-2519(a) and several court rules, including I.C.R. 33(b) and 49(c)
and I.R.C.P. 5(e) and 58(a), for the proposition that the entry of judgment
requires the filing of the judgment by the court clerk or judge. (Appellant's brief,
pp.14-15.)

Ciccone's reliance on these provisions is misplaced, however,

because there is no question that the court clerk actually filed the original
judgment of conviction in this case. The fact that the clerk erroneously dated the
filing stamp one month before judgment was actually entered does not affect the
validity of the original judgment; none of the provisions Ciccone cites require the
voiding of an otherwise properly entered judgment merely because the date of
the filing stamp is incorrect.

Rather, as even Ciccone recognizes on appeal

(Appellant's brief, pp.15-16), the error in the date of the filing stamp was merely
a clerical mistake, capable of correction at any time pursuant to I.C.R. 36
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("Clerical mistakes in judgments ... may be corrected by the court at any time
and after such notice, if any, as the court orders.").
The district court clerk served Ciccone with a copy of the original judgment
on June 8, 2005, the day after he was sentenced. (R., vol. II, p.341.) Despite
having notice of the date judgment was actually entered against him, Ciccone
never filed a motion pursuant to I. C. R. 36 for correction of the clerical mistake in
the date of the filing stamp, nor did the district court sua sponte order correction
of the filing stamp to reflect the date judgment was actually entered. While the
failure of Ciccone's trial counsel to move for correction of an obvious clerical
error may give rise to a claim for post-conviction relief, the clerical error does not
itself render the original judgment of conviction void or otherwise alter the
jurisdictional period in which Ciccone was required to file his notice of appeal.
Ciccone's argument to the contrary is without merit.
Also without merit is Ciccone's claim that, by entering an amended
judgment in which the only amendment was the date of the filing stamp, the
district court specifically intended to, and did in fact, alter the time for appeal.
(See Appellant's brief, pp.16-1 S.) Ciccone asks this Court to speculate that the
district court entered the amended judgment for the purpose of permitting
Ciccone to file a timely appeal;1 however, there simply is no evidence in the

1 Ciccone argues that he "was wrongfully denied his right to appeal by the clerk's
failure to accurately date the original Judgment and Commitment." (Appellant's
brief, p.17.) This argument is unavailing for two reasons. First, as already
discussed, the error in the filing stamp was merely a clerical mistake that could
have been corrected at any time pursuant to I.C.R. 36. Second, even absent
correction of the mistake, the time for appeal did not expire until June 20, 2005,
leaving Ciccone 12 days after he was sentenced to file a notice of appeal.
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record to support that claim. Had the court actually recognized the error in the
filing date of the original judgment, it could easily have corrected the error by the
simple expedient of amending the filing stamp to reflect the date judgment was
actually entered.

2

See I.C.R. 36. It did not do so. Instead, for reasons that are

not explained in the record, the court entered an amended judgment that was
both signed and filed on June 21, 2005. (R., vol. II, pp.342-45.) Thus, rather
than "amending" the file stamp to reflect the actual date of the entry of the
original judgment, the amended judgment simply bears a filing date consistent
with the date the amended judgment was entered. In this sense, the amended
judgment is like any other and its issuance did not extend the time in which
Ciccone was required to appeal from the original judgment of conviction. See
Payan, 128 Idaho at 867, 920 P.2d at 83 (The "issuance of an amended
judgment, which did not alter any of the terms from which Payan now appeals,
did not serve to extend the period for filing an appeal or begin that period
anew.").

To

the

extent

Ciccone's

trial

counsel

labored

under

the

misapprehension that the issuance of the amended judgment extended the time
in which he was required to file a notice of appeal on Ciccone's behalf, such
misapprehension is best addressed in post-conviction proceedings.

lsi at 867

n.1, 920 P.2d at 83 n.1.
The Idaho Court of Appeals recognized in Payan that "[t]he period of
appeals for all criminal defendants in this state must be enforced uniformly."

lsi

2 The state notes that, had the court taken action on June 21, 2007, to correct
the filing stamp to reflect the date judgment was actually entered, Ciccone still
would have had 28 days in which to file his notice of appeal.
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at 867, 920 P.2d at 83. Like Payan, Ciccone failed to file his notice of appeal
within 42 days of the entry of judgment as required by I.A.R. 14(a), and the
issuance of the amended judgment, which did not alter any of the terms of the
original judgment, did not extend the time for appeal. Because Ciccone's appeal
is not timely, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider it and it must be dismissed.
I.A.R. 21; Payan, 128 Idaho at 867,920 P.2d at 83.
II.
The District Court Correctly Applied The Law To The Facts In Concluding That
Ciccone Failed To Establish A Violation Of Either His Statutory Or Constitutional
Speedy Trial Rights
A.

Introd uction
Ciccone challenges the denial of his motion to dismiss, arguing that the

delay of almost 15 months from his arrest and almost one year from the filing of
the Information to the date of his trial violated his statutory and constitutional
speedy trial rights. (Appellant's brief, pp.18-35.) A review of the record and the
applicable law, however, supports the district court's determination that the delay
was reasonable and did not violate Ciccone's speedy trial rights.
B.

Standard Of Review
Whether there was an infringement of a defendant's right to a speedy trial

presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255, 257,
16 P.3d 931, 933 (2000); State v. Avila, 143 Idaho 849, 852, 153 P.3d 1195,
1198 (Ct. App. 2006). The appellate court defers to the trial court's findings of
fact that are supported by sUbstantial and competent evidence, but freely
reviews the trial court's application of the law to the facts found. Avila, 143 Idaho
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at 852, 153 P.3d at 1198, State v. Davis, 141 Idaho 828, 835, 118 P.3d 160, 167
(Ct. App. 2005).

C.

The District Court Correctly Applied The Law To The Facts In Concluding
That Good Cause Existed To Continue The Trial Beyond The Six-Month
Statutory Speedy Trial Period Of I.C. § 19-3501
Idaho Code § 19-3501 supplements the speedy trial provisions of the

United States and Idaho Constitutions and sets forth specific time limits within
which a criminal defendant must be brought to trial. State v. Clark, 135 Idaho
255, 257, 16 P.3d 931, 933 (2000).

Specifically, the portion of the

statute

relevant to this case provides:
The court, unless good cause to the contrary is shown, must
order the prosecution or indictment to be dismissed, in the following
cases:

(2) If a defendant, whose trial has not been postponed upon
his application, is not brought to trial within six (6) months from the
date that the information is filed with the court.
I.C. § 19-3501 (2). For purposes of this statute, "good cause means that there is
a sUbstantial reason that rises to the level of a legal excuse for the delay." Clark,
135 Idaho at 260, 16 P.3d at 936 (citing State v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 56, 58, 803
P.2d 557, 559 (Ct. App. 1990); State v. Stuart, 113 Idaho 494,496,745 P.2d
1115, 1117 (Ct. App. 1987)); accord State v. Young, 136 Idaho 113, 116,29
P.3d 949, 952 (2001).
There is no fixed rule for determining whether good cause exists to delay
a trial and, as such, the matter is initially left to the discretion of the trial court.
Young, 136 Idaho at 116, 29 P.3d at 952 (citing Clark, 135 Idaho at 260, 16 P.3d
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at 936). The trial court's discretion is not unbridled, however, and its decision is
subject to independent review on appeal.

!!:h

Ultimately, "whether legal excuse

has been shown is a matter for judicial determination upon the facts and
circumstances of each case." Clark, 135 Idaho at 260, 16 P.3d at 936 (citing
Johnson, 119 Idaho at 58, 803 P.2d at 559; Stuart, 113 Idaho at 496,745 P.2d
at 1117).
In this case, the state filed the Information charging Ciccone with two
counts of first degree murder on January 27, 2004.

(R., vol. I, pp.60-61.)

Ciccone's trial was originally set to commence on July 20, 2004 (R., vol. I, pp.6263, 66-67), one week before the expiration of the sixth-month statutory speedy
trial period of I.C. § 19-3501 (2). On July 16, 2004, the state filed a motion to
continue the trial, asserting as the primary basis for its request that several of its
witnesses were active duty military personnel assigned to temporary duty ("TDY")
outside the state and were unavailable for trial.

(R., vol. I, pp.102-109.) The

district court conducted a hearing on the motion, at which Ciccone's trial counsel
objected to a continuance and asserted Ciccone's speedy trial rights. (7/19/04
Tr., p.19, L.13 - p.24, L. 7.) After considering all of the information before it, the
district court granted the state's request for a continuance, finding that the state
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had carried its burden of demonstrating good cause for the delay.3 (7/19/04 Tr.,
p.26, L.24 - p.32, L.8.) Contrary to Ciccone's arguments on appeal, application
of the law to the facts and circumstances of this case supports the district court's
determination that the state's witnesses were unavailable and, as such, good
cause existed to continue the trial. 4
It is well established that the unavailability of a witness constitutes a valid
reason to justify delay of a trial.

Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 531 (1972);

Clark, 135 Idaho at 260,16 P.3d at 936; Davis, 141 Idaho at 837,118 P.3d at
169. To demonstrate witness unavailability, the state is required to show more
than mere inconvenience, i.e., that "attendance at trial would be burdensome."
Clark, 135 Idaho at 260,16 P.3d at 936; Davis, 141 Idaho at 837,118 P.3d at

3 In finding good cause, the district court specifically stated that it had relied on,
among other things, "the affidavits and statements of the State." (7/19/04 Tr.,
p.27, L.23 - p.28, L.3.) According to the Register of Actions, the state only filed
one affidavit in support of its motion for a continuance. (See R., vol. I, p.5.) The
affidavit, in which the prosecutor merely attested that the facts contained in the
motion for a continuance were all true, is not currently part of the appellate
record. The state is in possession of a file stamped copy of the affidavit,
however, and will file a motion, contemporaneously with the filing of this brief, to
augment the appellate record with it.
In addition to asserting the unavailability of several of its witnesses, the state
also asserted as ancillary bases for its request for a continuance that: 1) the
defense had only very recently provided the state with the curriculum vitae of its
accident reconstruction expert (R., vol. I, pp.105-06; 7/19/04 Tr., p.15, L.9 p.16, L.22), and 2) the parties needed more time than originally allotted to fully
try the case (7/19/04 Tr., p.16, L.25 - p.19, L.9). The district court considered
each of these asserted bases as factors in its decision to grant the state's motion
for a continuance (7/19/04 Tr., p.27, L.23 - p.28, L.23, p.31, Ls.12-21) but, in
evaluating the reason for the delay, ultimately focused on the facts and
circumstances surrounding the unavailability of the state's witnesses (7/19/04
Tr., p.28, L.24 - p.30, L.11). The state believes the trial court's determination as
to the unavailability of witnesses is dispositive of Ciccone's statutory speedy trial
claim and therefore limits its analysis of the reason for delay to this issue.
4
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169. Rather, "[t)rue unavailability suggests an unqualified inability to attend."

kl

Although the Idaho appellate courts have never addressed whether a witness'
assignment to military duty constitutes unavailability for purposes of determining
whether good cause exists to delay a trial, other courts that have considered the
issue hold that the unavailability of a material witness due to service in the
United States armed forces constitutes sufficient justification for delay.

See,

lUL, Bell v. State, 651 S.E.2d 218, 219-20 (Ga. App. 2007); Commonwealth v.
Hyland, 875 A.2d 1175, 1190-92 (Pa. 2005); Kelley v. Commonwealth, 439
S.E.2d 616, 619 (Va. App. 1994).

In its written motion for a continuance, the state identified seven material
witnesses, six of whom the state represented were either TOY or otherwise
unavailable for trial due to active duty military service. (R., vol. I, pp.1 03-1 05.)
At the hearing on the state's motion, the prosecutor elaborated on the witnesses'
status, noting that three of them (Michael Almond, Jeremy Christianson and
Jason Oelion) were on TOY assignment in South Korea, and that a fourth (Steve
Brown) was on active National Guard duty in Texas preparing for a two-year
deployment to Iraq.

(7/19/04 Tr., p.9, L.18 - p.12, L.3.)

The state also

represented, both in its written motion and at the hearing, that, despite diligent
efforts by the state, the names of most of the witnesses were not disclosed to the
state because of military procedures until the end of June and that, upon
disclosure, the state immediately sent out subpoenas but received information in
July that many of the witnesses were unavailable due to their assignments in the
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military.

(R., vol. I, pp.102-03, 105; 7/19/04 Tr., p.9, Ls.1-25, p.11, Ls.15-21,

p.24, L.10 - p.25, L.1.)
In ruling on the state's motion for a continuance, the district court
considered the state's representations and determined, based on the facts and
circumstances of this case, that the state had established good cause for
continuance of the trial beyond the six-month statutory speedy trial period of I.C.

§ 19-3501. Specifically, the court explained:
[I]t appears that the prosecution in this case did make efforts
to be in touch with the Air Force with regard to these witnesses;
that according to the affidavit the Information with regard to the
witnesses was not provided until June; that the prosecution was not
advised that some of those witnesses were out of the country, out
of reach of the subpoena power of this court until July a few days
prior to trial.
Certainly hindsight is always 20-20. And the fact of the
matter is that we must recognize that this is a military community
and military do in fact have their own procedures and the United
States is at the current time in a state of war in two countries. And
that military personnel are being switched around, moved for
training on a regular basis, which creates a problem for the
prosecution. Probably even greater than those that are presented
when the United States is not in that situation.
Prosecution's representation is that it did not know that
these witnesses would not be available until July. Intent is a key
element in a first degree murder trial and certain of these witnesses
directly relate to the issue of intent. Not only is the defendant ...
entitled to a fair and speedy trial, but the people as well are entitled
to a fair and speedy trial. And it would be ... an extreme hardship
on the State to attempt to obtain these people on such short notice.
It is possible they could not be obtained at all.
(7/19/04 Tr., p.29, L.5 - p.30, L.11.)

On appeal, Ciccone does not challenge the trial court's factual
determination that certain witnesses identified by the state in its motion were
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material to the state's case on the issue of Ciccone's intent. Nor does he dispute
that at least six of the witnesses were TOY or otherwise assigned to armed
forces duty out of the state. He argues, however, that the state was negligent in
its efforts to locate the witnesses because, rather than conducting its own
investigation, the state relied upon the Air Force's investigation to ascertain the
witnesses' identities and whereabouts.

(Appellant's brief, pp.24-25, 35.)

Ciccone has failed to show error in the trial court's good cause determination,
however, because he has failed to show either that the state was negligent, or
that any negligence contributed to the unavailability of the witnesses who were
on active military duty.
As Ciccone repeatedly emphasizes on appeal, at the time he committed
the murders in this case he was a Staff Sergeant in the United States Air Force,
stationed at the Mountain Home Air Force Base. All of the witnesses the state
identified in its motion for a continuance were active duty or retired military
personnel who had knowledge of facts relevant to the crimes committed by
another member of the armed forces.

(R., pp.102-05.)

Although Ciccone

contends that the state should have duplicated the Air Force's investigative
efforts, he has failed to cite any authority or point to any facts to establish that
the state should have, or even could have, ascertained the witnesses' identities
and whereabouts more expediently than was accomplished by the internal
military investigation. The district court specifically found that the crime occurred
in a military community, that the military has its own procedures, and that the
state did make diligent efforts to obtain the information from the Air Force within
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the deadlines for discovery. (7/19/04 Tr., p.29, Ls.5-17.) Ciccone's claim that
the state was negligent in not conducting its own investigation not only ignores
the trial court's factual findings, it also fails to take into account the unique facts
and circumstances of this case.
Even assuming the state was somehow negligent in not conducting its
own investigation, Ciccone has failed to show how any such negligence actually
contributed to the unavailability of the witnesses who were TDY or its functional
equivalent. Admittedly, the state identified one witness (Robert Reagan) who
was not on active duty and who, had the state made an earlier attempt to locate
him, may have been available to testify at trial. (R., vol. I, p.104.) However, the
remaining six witnesses were out of the state (or country) on orders of the
federal government. There is simply no reason to believe that, had the state
made earlier attempts to locate those witnesses, their military assignments would
still not have prevented them from attending the July 2004 trial. Indeed, at least
one court has recognized that a witness' military deployment is a circumstance
beyond the state's control. See Commonwealth v. Hyland, 875 A.2d 1175, 1191
(Pa. 2005) (the deployment of a material witness to the Middle East was a
circumstance over which the prosecution had no control).
This is not a case in which the state sought a continuance of the trial
merely for the purpose of accommodating the witnesses' schedules. Compare
State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255, 260-61, 16 P.3d 931, 936-37 (2000).

Nor is it a

case in which the state's negligence contributed to the unavailability of the
witnesses.

Compare Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652-53 (1992).
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The witnesses' military assignments were matters beyond the state's control and
rendered the witnesses unavailable for trial.

£&, Bell v. State, 651 S.E.2d 218,

219-20 (Ga. App. 2007); Hyland, 875 A.2d at 1190-92; Kelley v. Commonwealth,
439 S.E.2d 616, 619 (Va. App. 1994). The district court correctly determined,
based on the facts and circumstances of this case, that the unavailability of the
state's witnesses constituted good cause to delay Ciccone's trial beyond the sixmonth statutory deadline of I.C. § 19-3501. Ciccone has failed to establish a
violation of his statutory speedy trial rights.

D.

5

The District Court Correctly Applied The Law To The Facts In Concluding
That Ciccone Failed To Establish A Violation Of His Constitutional Speedy
Trial Rights
"Both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article

1, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution guarantee to criminal defendants the right to a
speedy trial." State v. Lopez, 144 Idaho 349, 352, 160 P.3d 1284, 1287 (Ct.
App. 2007). When analyzing claims of speedy trial violations under the state and
federal constitutions, the Idaho appellate courts utilize the four-part balancing
test set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S.

The state submits that, even if the unavailability of the state's witnesses did not
constitute good cause sufficient to justify delay of the trial beyond the six-month
statutory period of I.C. § 19-3501, any error in the court's decision to continue
the trial was harmless. Where, as here, a defendant is facing felony charges,
the remedy for a statutory speedy trial violation is dismissal without prejudice.
See I.C. §§ 19-3501, 19-3506. Thus, even had the trial court dismissed the case
on the basis of a statutory speedy trial violation, the state could have simply refiled the charges and proceeded to trial against Ciccone in a new criminal action.
But see State v. McKeeth, 136691, 38 P.3d 1275 (Ct. App. 2001) (reversing
felony judgment of conviction on basis of statutory speedy trial violation, albeit
without engaging in harmless error analysis); State v. Stuart, 113 Idaho 494, 745
P.2d 1115 (Ct. App. 1987) (same).
5
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514 (1972).

State v. Young. 136 Idaho 113, 117, 29 P.3d 949, 953 (2001);

Lopez, 144 Idaho at 352, 160 P.3d at 1288; State v. Avila, 143 Idaho 849, 853,
153 P.3d 1195, 1199 (Ct. App. 2006). The factors to be considered are: (1) the
length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of
his or her right to a speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice occasioned by the delay.
Barker, 407 U.S. at 530.
Contrary to Ciccone's arguments on appeal, balancing of these factors in
this case supports the district 'court's determination that Ciccone failed to
establish a violation of his constitutional rights to a speedy trial.
1.

The Length Of The Delay, While Sufficient To Trigger Balancing,
Does Not Weigh In Ciccone's Favor

"The length of the delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism. Until
there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for
inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance." Barker, 407 U.S. at 530.
For purposes of the Sixth Amendment, "the period of delay is measured from the
date there is 'a formal indictment or information or else the actual restraints
imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge.'" Lopez, 144 Idaho
at 352, 160 P.3d at 1287 (citing United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320
(1971); Young. 136 Idaho at 117, 29 P.3d at 953.) "Similarly, under the Idaho
Constitution, the period of delay is measured from the date formal charges are
filed or the defendant is arrested, whichever occurs first." Lopez, 144 Idaho at
352, 160 P.3d at 1287 (citations omitted). Once the balancing test is triggered,
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the length of delay also becomes a factor in and of itself. Avila, 143 Idaho at
853,153 P.3d at 1199.
Ciccone was arrested on October 16, 2003, and the state brought him to
trial on January 4,2005. The state concedes that the delay of nearly 15 months
is sufficient to trigger the Barker balancing test - but not by much. See State v.
Campbell, 104 Idaho 705, 708, 662 P.2d 1149, 1152 (Ct. App. 1983) (citing
State v. Talmage, 104 Idaho 249, 252, 658 P.2d 920, 923 (1983)) ("A delay of
[approximately 12 months] is sufficient to trigger an inquiry into whether speedy
trial has been denied."). As noted in Barker, the reasonableness of length of the
delay must be evaluated in light of the nature of the offense for which the
defendant is standing trial: "[T]he delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary
street crime is considerably less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge."
Barker, 407 U.S. 531. Considering the nature of the charges on which Ciccone
was standing trial - two counts of first degree murder - the length of the delay
was not substantial and does not weigh heavily in Ciccone's favor.
Moreover, the length of the delay is not dispositive.

None of the four

Barker factors is by itself "either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding
of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial." Barker, 407 U.S. at 533. Because
there were valid reasons for the delay, and because Ciccone was not unfairly
prejudiced by the delay, the length of the delay should be excused.
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2.

The Unavailability Of The State's Witnesses Constituted A Valid
Reason For The Delay

Implicit in the standards applicable to claims of constitutional speedy trial
violations is the recognition that "pretrial delay is often both inevitable and wholly
justifiable." Avila, 143 Idaho at 853,153 P.3d at 1199 (citing Doggett v. United
States, 505 U.S. 647, 656 (1992»; State v. Davis, 141 Idaho 828,837,118 P.3d
160, 169 (Ct. App. 2005) (same). For that reason, different weights are assigned
to different reasons for the delay. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. As explained by the
Supreme Court:
A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the
defense should be weighted heavily against the government. A
more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts
should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be
considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances
must rest with the government rather than with the defendant.
Finally, a valid reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to
justify appropriate delay.

& at 531 (footnote omitted).
Ciccone concedes on appeal that the state is not responsible for a month
and a half of the nearly 15-month delay in bringing him to trial. (Appellant's brief,
p.22.) He also concedes that the state never deliberately delayed the case in
order to hamper the defense.

(Id., p.23.)

He argues, however, that the

remaining delay must be weighed against the state, contending that the state
failed to present any valid reason to justify the delay in bringing him to trial. (Id.,
pp.23-24.) Ciccone's argument is without merit.

For the reasons set forth in

Section II.C., above, the district court correctly determined that the state's
witnesses were unavailable and that their unavailability constituted a valid reason
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to justify an appropriate delay. Furthermore, although the responsibility for the
trial court's inability to reschedule Ciccone's trial for an additional six months
must "rest with the government," the court's busy calendar is ultimately a neutral
reason for the delay and, although it must be considered, does not weigh heavily
against the state. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531; State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255, 261,
16 P.3d 931, 937 (2000).
3.

Ciccone Did Not Timely Assert His Constitutional Speedy Trial
Rights

The third factor in the Barker analysis is whether and how the defendant
asserted his constitutional right to a speedy trial. A defendant's assertion of his
right is "entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining whether the
defendant is being deprived of the right." Barker, 407 U.S. at 531-32; Davis, 141
Idaho 839, 118 P.3d at 171. "[F]ailure to assert the right will make it difficult for a
defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial."

ll:L.

Although Ciccone asserted his statutory right to a speedy trial at the July
19, 2004 hearing on the state's motion for a continuance (7119104 Tr., p.19,
Ls.13-23), he did not unequivocally assert a constitutional right to a speedy trial
until he filed his motion to dismiss on December 20,2004 (R., vol. II, pp.168-69;
see also Trial Tr., p.41, L.18 - p.43, L.2). This assertion of rights came over 14
months after his arrest and just two weeks before his January 4, 2005 trial was
set to commence. Ciccone's assertion of his rights so late in the proceedings
does not weigh in favor of dismissal under the Barker balancing test. See State

v. Lopez, 144 Idaho 349,353,160 P.3d 1284, 1288 (Ct. App. 2007); Davis, 141
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Idaho at 839,118 P.3d at 171; State v. Rodriquez-Perez, 129 Idaho 29,317,921
P.2d 206, 214 (Ct. App. 1996).

4.

Ciccone Failed To Establish That He Was Unfairly Prejudiced By
The Delay

The final and most important factor in the Barker analysis is the nature
and extent of any prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the delay.
Barker, 407 U.S. at 532; Lopez, 144 Idaho at 354, 160 P.3d at 1289; Davis, 141
Idaho at 840, 118 P.3d at 172. As explained by the Idaho Supreme Court:
Prejudice is to be assessed in light of the interests of defendants
which the right to a speedy trial is designed to protect. Those
interests are (1) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) to
minimize anxiety and concern of the accused, and (3) to limit the
possibility that the defense will be impaired.
Young, 136 Idaho at 118, 29 P.3d at 954 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 532).
Accord Lopez, 144 Idaho at 354-55, 160 P.3d at 1289-90; Avila, 143 Idaho at
854,153 P.3d at 1200; Davis, 141 Idaho at 840,118 P.3d at 172. "The third of
these is the most significant because a hindrance to adequate preparation of the
defense 'skews the fairness of the entire system.'" Lopez, 144 Idaho at 355, 160
P.3d at 1290 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 532; State v. Hernandez, 133 Idaho 576,
583,990 P.2d 742, 749 (Ct. App. 1999)).
There is no question that Ciccone was continuously incarcerated in jail for
15 months while awaiting trial, and during that time he undoubtedly felt the
anxiety and concern that any incarcerated individual would suffer.

Despite

Ciccone's argument to the contrary, however, there simply is no evidence in the
record to support his claim that his defense was actually impaired by the delay.
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In fact, the only "prejudice" Ciccone cites is the fact that, at trial, one of the
state's witnesses failed to recall having been asked a specific question at the
preliminary hearing. (Appellant's brief, pp.33-34.) This fact hardly establishes
impairment of the defense, however, particularly since a review of the trial
transcript shows that Ciccone's counsel ably cross-examined the state's witness
and impeached her with her preliminary hearing testimony (see Trial Tr., p.520,
L.9 - p.524, L.23, p.540, L.19 - p.542, L.19) and thereafter specifically made
use of the witness' inconsistent statements during closing argument (see Trial
Tr., p.1827, Ls.5-25). Ciccone's remaining claim - that, in light of one witness'
lapse of memory "one must wonder how reliable any of the witness' testimony
was so long after the fact" (Appellant's brief, p.34) - is speculative on its face
and falls far short of demonstrating actual prejudice. See United States v. Loud
Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 315 (1986) (alleging only a "possibility of prejudice is not
sufficient to support" a claim of a speedy trial violation).

5.

A Balancing Of The Barker Factors Weighs Against A Finding Of A
Speedy Trial Violation

The four Barker factors, together with any other relevant circumstances,
must be balanced and weighed to determine whether an individual's right to a
speedy trial was violated. Barker, 407 U.S. at 533. In this case, although the
length of the delay was sufficient to trigger a constitutional analysis, the
remaining factors, on balance, weigh against a finding of a speedy trial violation.
The state sought the delay for a valid reason and, although some of the delay
was attributable to the court's calendar, Ciccone failed to timely assert his
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constitutional speedy trial rights and failed to demonstrate that he was unfairly
prejudiced by the delay. Ciccone has therefore failed to show error in the denial
of his motion to dismiss.

III.
Ciccone Is Not Entitled To Relief On Any Of His Prosecutorial Misconduct Claims
A.

Introduction
Ciccone argues that the prosecutor made several comments during

closing argument that prejudiced his right to a fair trial. (Appellant's brief, pp.3746.) Ciccone has failed to establish any basis for reversal, however, because he
has failed to establish that his due process rights were violated as a result of any
alleged prosecutorial misconduct.
B.

Standard Of Review And General Legal Standards Governing Claims Of
Prosecutorial Misconduct
A defendant is not entitled to relief based upon a claim of prosecutorial

misconduct unless he can establish two things: (1) the complained of conduct
was improper; and (2) the improper conduct prejudiced him. State v. RomeroGarcia, 139 Idaho 199, 202, 75 P.3d 1209, 1212 (Ct. App. 2003). Thus, a mere
assertion or finding that a particular question or statement was objectionable or
improper is insufficient to establish prosecutorial misconduct. As explained by
the United States Supreme Court:

"[IJt is not enough that the prosecutors'

remarks were undesirable or even universally condemned.

The relevant

question is whether the prosecutors' comments so infected the trial with
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process." Darden
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v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (internal quotations and citations
omitted); see also Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982) ("[Tlhe touchstone
of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the
fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.") In that regard, the
Supreme Court has indicated prosecutorial misconduct may occur where the
prosecutor "manipulate[s] or misstate[s] the evidence" or "implicate[s] other
specific rights of the accused such as the right to counselor the right to remain
silent."

lli. at 181-82.

However, "a criminal conviction is not to be lightly

overturned on the basis of a prosecutor's comments standing alone, for the
statements or conduct must be viewed in context; only by so doing can it be
determined whether the prosecutor's conduct affected the fairness of the trial."
United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11 (1985). Thus, the Court must consider
the probable effect that the prosecutor's argument "would have on the jury's
ability to judge the evidence fairly."

lli. at 11-12. Consistent with Darden and

Young, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that a conviction will be set aside for
prosecutorial misconduct only when the conduct is sufficiently egregious as to
result in fundamental error.

State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 507, 988 P.2d

1170, 1181 (1999).
With respect to prosecutorial misconduct in the context of closing
argument the Supreme Court has stated:
Isolated passages of a prosecutor's argument, billed in advance to
the jury as a matter of opinion not of evidence, do not reach the
same proportions. Such arguments, like all closing arguments of
counsel, are seldom carefully constructed in toto before the event;
improvisation frequently results in syntax left imperfect and
meaning less than crystal clear. While these general observations
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in no way justify prosecutorial misconduct, they do suggest that a
court should not lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an
ambiguous remark to have its most damaging meaning or that a
jury, sitting through lengthy exhortation, will draw that meaning from
the plethora of less damaging interpretations.
Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 646-47 (1974).
The Idaho Supreme Court has recently reiterated the importance of
reviewing closing arguments in light of their improvisational nature, noting that "in
reviewing allegations of prosecutorial misconduct [the appellate court] must keep
in mind the realities of trial." State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571, 165 P.3d 273,
285 (2007) (quoting State v. Estes, 111 Idaho 423,427-28,725 P.2d 128, 13233 (1986)). The Idaho Supreme Court has further recognized "[t]he right to due
process does not guarantee a defendant an error-free trial but a fair one," and
the function of appellate review is "not to discipline the prosecutor for
misconduct, but to ensure that any such misconduct did not interfere with the
defendant's right to a fair trial." State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445, 451,816 P.2d
1002, 1008 (Ct. App. 1991).
Application of the foregoing standards to Ciccone's claims of prosecutorial
misconduct reveals he was not deprived of a fair trial.

C.

Ciccone Is Not Entitled To Relief On Either Of His Allegations That The
Prosecutor Engaged In Misconduct By Commenting On His Silence
Ciccone argues the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by "twice

comment[ing]" on Ciccone's failure to testify during his rebuttal closing argument.
(Appellant's brief, pp.36-40.) Both of Ciccone's arguments fail.
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Prosecutors have considerable latitude in closing argument and have the
right to discuss the evidence and the inferences and deductions arising
therefrom. State v. Payne, _

P.3d _ , 2008 WL 2447447 *12 (Idaho 2008)

State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 280, 77 P.3d 956, 969 (2003); State v.
Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86, 156 P.3d 583, 587 (Ct. App. 2007). The purpose of
the prosecutor's closing argument is to enlighten the jury and help the jurors
remember and interpret the evidence. State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445, 450,
816 P.2d 1002, 1007 (Ct. App. 1991).

Where, as here, the comments

complained of occurred during a rebuttal closing argument, the United States
Supreme Court has held, "[t)he prosecutors' comments must be evaluated in
light of the defense argument that preceded it." Darden, 477 U.S. at 179.
In this case, two of the statements Ciccone complains of were made in
response to the general theme of defense counsel's closing argument, and the
theory of Ciccone's defense, that Kathleen's death was nothing more than a
tragic accident that occurred because Ciccone was "in a hurry" and "going too
fast."

(Trial Tr., p.1826, Ls.10-12, p.1828, Ls.11-22, p.1842, Ls.5-8, p.1845,

Ls.12-24, p.1846, Ls.11-13, p.1847, Ls.1-2.) As part of his closing argument,
counsel for Ciccone asked the jury to reject the state's theory that Ciccone and
Kathleen had an argument immediately prior to Ciccone running Kathleen down
in the road. Specifically, counsel argued:
Now, we have seen from the evidence on the K & R ranch
Road that we have French fries, we had cigarettes, we had Ieee,
we had a sweater, we had a purse, we had track marks all on the K
& R Ranch Road.
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[Ciccone] stated in the interview Kathleen had the food on
her side. The purse was found in the middle of the road. But think
about it. A woman's purse. That's a sacred thing. The State
seems to imply that [Ciccone] was throwing the purse. [Ciccone]
was throwing the medicine. [Ciccone] was throwing the food.
That's totally inconsistent with our day-to-day norm. It is totally
inconsistent with the evidence.
They don't dispute the fact that the bag, the Burger King,
and the Icee was in Kathleen's possession. How many women do
we know that will reach in a car that she is a passenger in and put
the purse somewhere where [Ciccone] could throw it at her? That
simply does not make sense.
So you have got a purse. You have got food. You have got
a tiff, you've got a huff, however you want to classify it. The
accident scene.
(Trial Tr., p.1833, L.5-p.1834, L.3.)
In response, the prosecutor argued:
Let's talk about [counsel] talking about the scene on K & R
Ranch Road. How this precious purse a woman would have
carried, the bag of food she obviously had in her possession
because that's what [Ciccone] said.
So I guess she has got the purse in the car, the bag of food
in the car, the medicine, the sweater tied around her and
everything. And she decided to get out with all of that stuff on K &
R Ranch Road ... and decided to walk however many feet -- let's
just say -- it is on the chart -- walk up there with all the purse,
sweatshirt tied around her waist, bottle of pills, and all the food bag,
and had enough wherewithal to throw it all. at him right- or lefthanded. Maybe she put the purse down to get the McDonalds bag
or Burger King to throw at him. Maybe she just left it there. I don't
know. There's only two people that know, and Kathleen Ciccone
isn't here to tell us.
(Trial Tr., p.1853, Ls.3-23.)
Ciccone argues that the last sentence, referring to "only two people that
know," was an impermissible comment on Ciccone's failure to testify and that
although he did not object to this comment, the comment was "so egregious

30

and/or inflammatory that consequent prejudice could not have been remedied by
any admonishment from the district court."

(Appellant's brief, pAD.)

When

considered in context, however, it is clear the prosecutor was not commenting on
Ciccone's failure to testify.

Quite the contrary, the prosecutor was only

responding to defense counsel's reference to Ciccone's explanation during his
interview with Detective Wolfe about the state of certain evidence, such as
Kathleen's purse, at the murder scene and how that explanation was supposedly
consistent with Ciccone's claim that he "accidentally" hit Kathleen with his car.
Because the prosecutor's comments centered around

Ciccone's actual

statements and Kathleen's inability to refute them, rather than Ciccone's failure
to testify, Ciccone has failed to establish error much less error "so egregious
and/or inflammatory that consequent prejudice could not have been remedied by
any admonishment from the district court."
Ciccone's second claim of prosecutorial misconduct is similar to his first in
that it is based on an assertion that the prosecutor made an impermissible
reference to Ciccone's failure to testify. Specifically, Ciccone complains about
the following comments made during the prosecutor's rebuttal closing:
There is no testimony that he was looking down at is [sic]
watch, that the cigarette smoke had blown in his face, that he was
changing the radio station, that a cassette dropped, a cigarette
dropped in his pants, he had to try and put it out real quick. No
testimony as to that. Absolutely none. He doesn't say anything
about any-(Trial Tr., p.1856, Ls.2-9.)
Ciccone objected to this argument, the court sustained the objection, and
a discussion was held off the record. (Trial Tr., p.1856, Ls.1D-13.) In addition, at
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the conclusion of the prosecutor's rebuttal closing, the court admonished the
jury:
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, the jury will disregard any
argument based upon what the defendant did not say. As stated
earlier in instruction 55, a defendant in a criminal trial has a
constitutional right not to be compelled to testify. The decision of
whether to testify is left to the defendant acting with the advice and
assistance of the defendant's lawyer. You must not draw any
inference of guilt from the fact the defendant did not testify."
(Trial Tr., p.1861, L.25-p.1861, LA.)
Ciccone argues the prosecutor's comments "violated his Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment right to silence because ... he is the only one who
could have offered 'testimony' to explain how it was that he was unable to avoid
hitting his wife with his vehicle . . .. "

(Appellant's brief, pAD.)

Ciccone's

argument fails because, although the district court sustained Ciccone's objection
to the prosecutor's argument and the court's subsequent admonishment
indicates it did so on the theory that the prosecutor's comments were an
improper reference to Ciccone's failure to testify, the prosecutor's comments can
equally be viewed as a comment not on Ciccone's silence or his failure to testify,
but on the absence of any reasonable explanation during his interview with
Detective Wolfe from which the jury could conclude Kathleen's death was the
result of an accident.
While it is undoubtedly true that a prosecutor may not comment on a
defendant's silence or his failure to testify as evidence of his guilt, State v.
Strouse, 133 Idaho 709, 992 P.2d 158 (1999), the prosecutor's comments must
be viewed in light of the evidence presented to the jury, and the Court should not

32

"lightly infer ... the most damaging meaning" or assume the jury "dr[e]w that
meaning from ... less damaging interpretations." DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. at
647.

Rather, as explained in State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445, 449-50, 816

P.2d 1002, 1006-07 (Ct. App. 1991), "the propriety of a given argument will
depend largely upon the facts of each case" and the prosecutor may properly
present argument based on the evidence in the record.
The evidence in the record in this case included the transcripts of two
interviews between Detective Wolfe and Ciccone.

(Exhibits 62, 63.)

During

those interviews, Ciccone talked about the "accident," but never gave any
reasonable explanation of how the "accident" occurred, such as those suggested
by the prosecutor during his rebuttal closing argument. While the prosecutor's
use of the word "testimony" in making his argument may have been inartful, it is
plausible that he was merely referring to the absence of any reasonable
explanation during Ciccone's interviews, not on his failure to testify or his postMiranda silence because Ciccone was undoubtedly not silent during those
interviews.

Given the two possible interpretations of the prosecutor's rebuttal

argument regarding the absence of "testimony" regarding how an "accident" may
have occurred, the Court "cannot conclude that [the prosecutor's comment] was
manifestly intended to be, or of such a character that the jury would naturally and
necessarily take it to be" an impermissible reference to Ciccone's failure to
testify. Reynolds, 120 Idaho at 450, 816 P.2d at 1007.
Ciccone also argues that the court's admonishment was "insufficient to
remedy that prejudice to the defendant." (Appellant's brief, p.42.) Ciccone is
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incorrect. Even assuming this Court views the comment as an infringement on
Ciccone's Fifth Amendment right, any potential prejudice was cured by the
court's instruction to the jury that it was to "disregard any argument based upon
what the defendant did not say," and "must not draw any inference of guilt from
the fact [Ciccone] did not testify."

(Trial Tr., p.1860, L.24 - p.1861, L.9.)

Ciccone's claim that this Court is precluded from finding the error harmless under
State v. Lopez, 141 Idaho 575, 114 P.3d 133 (Ct. App. 2005), is without merit.
(Appellant's brief, p.41.)
In Lopez, the defendant claimed his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights were violated "when the state attempted to impeach him by questioning
him and a detective regarding his failure to tell the officers his version of the
events immediately after the incident."

141 Idaho at 577, 114 P.3d at 135.

Although Lopez did not object to the questions at trial, the appellate court
addressed his claim under the fundamental error doctrine, and concluded the
"state's comments in closing argument [were] impermissible uses of postMiranda silence." JJ;l at 577-78, 114 P.3d at 135-36. Importantly, however, the

court then conducted a harmless error analysis noting, the error was not
reversible unless it was prejudicial. JJ;l at 578, 114 P.3d at 136. As such, Lopez
clearly does not stand for the proposition advocated by Ciccone, i.e., that
whenever a claim of prosecutorial misconduct based upon a comment on the
defendant's silence is reviewed under the fundamental error doctrine, the error
can never be harmless because it cannot be cured by a judicial admonition.
(Appellant's brief, pp.41-42.)

To the contrary, Idaho appellate courts have
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consistently subjected claims reviewed under the fundamental error doctrine to a
harmless error analysis, including claims based on alleged prosecutorial
misconduct in closing argument.

See,~,

State v. Timmons, 145 Idaho 279,

_ , 178 P.3d 644, 657 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Kuhn, 139 Idaho 710,715-16,
685 P.3d 1109, 1114-15 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Cortez, 135 Idaho 561,566,21
P.3d 498,503 (Ct. App. 2001); State v. Brown, 131 Idaho 61,70,951 P.2d 1288,
1297 (Ct. App. 1998).
Because, even assuming the prosecutor's statements were improper, the
error was harmless due to the court's curative instruction, which the jury was
presumed to have followed, Ciccone has failed to establish a due process
violation entitling him to a new trial.

D.

The Prosecutor's Reference To Kathleen's Death As A Tragedy And His
Request For Justice Did Not Constitute Misconduct
In his closing argument, counsel for Ciccone, after asserting Kathleen's

death was nothing more than a tragic accident, argued:
Forget about the lawyers and lawsuit. He wishes he could
bring her back, but he can't. So June Ciccone, Kathy Figueredo,
they have held their kids in their hands all these years. I have held
[Ciccone] in my hands for the. past year. Now I am going to hand
him over to you, each of you individually. You each hold [Ciccone]
in your hands. You each have the power to make a decision. You
each have the ability to decide how to handle this case, each and
every one of you. And you can't let anybody else bully you. You
can't let anybody else step on you. You have to go back there in
that room, that little room back there, and decide. You, each of
you, have to decide.

You each have got [Ciccone] in your hands. You each get to
decide. You each have that power. So use it, use it faithfully.
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Follow the rules given to you by the judge. Make sure he proves
any case he has got beyond a reasonable doubt. Look at that
evidence. Because right now, I am giving you [Ciccone]. Thank
you.
(Trial Tr., p.1847, L.13 - p.1848, L.13.)
In rebuttal closing, the prosecutor commented, in relevant part:
This case is about Kathleen Ciccone's death, not the
mother's pains, not about Albert Ciccone's being in the hands of
[defense counsel]. It is about how and why she died.
When you kill somebody, you take away everything they
have and everything they ever will have. Kathleen was 22 years
old. Her death is a tragedy. Give her life meaning and give her
death the sense of justice that it requires. Hold the defendant
accountable for the purposeful, willful, deliberate, premeditated
actions that he took that night. Thank you.
(Trial Tr., p.1860, Ls.15-22.)
Although he did not object to any of the foregoing comments at trial,
Ciccone argues on appeal that the prosecutor's comments in rebuttal were
"plainly improper because they asked the jury to convict Mr. Ciccone for a reason
wholly irrelevant to his actual guilt or innocence-its sympathy for the deceased
victim."

(Appellant's brief, p.45.)

More specifically, Ciccone claims "the

prosecutor's focus on everything that had been lost when Kathleen died and the
sheer tragedy of her death, was an unabashed plea for the jury to convict Mr.
Ciccone of the greatest charge, first degree murder, based on its sympathy for
the victim." (Appellant's brief, p.45.) Ciccone's claim fails.
The prosecutor's characterization of Kathleen's death as a tragedy was
not an "unabashed plea for the jury to convict" Ciccone of first-degree murder.
Rather, the prosecutor was merely repeating what Ciccone himself already
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argued.

That the prosecutor followed his shared belief that Kathleen's death

was a tragedy with a request for justice, did not render the comment misconduct,
nor was his request that the jury give Kathleen's death justice and hold Ciccone
accountable improper.

See State v. Larsen, 81 Idaho 90, 98, 337 P.2d 1, 6

(1959) ('The general rule is that argument by the prosecuting attorney merely
urging the jurors in a criminal prosecution to do their duty, and to enforce the
criminal law generally or the particular law under which the prosecution was
instituted, does not constitute a ground for a new trial or a reversal but is within
the range of proper argument.") (citation omitted).

Rather, the prosecutor's

rebuttal argument was a proper, measured response to Ciccone's argument that
the jury should "hold [Ciccone] in [their] hands" and only find him guilty of
"accidentally" plowing into his wife at 50 mph, killing her and their unborn child.
Even if this brief portion of the prosecutor's rebuttal argument could be
deemed improper, it does not amount to fundamental error. The sole contested
element at trial was Ciccone's intent. Referring to Kathleen's death as a tragedy
and asking the jury to "[gjive her life meaning and give her death the sense of
justice that it requires," did not so infect the trial with unfairness that it violated
due process because it could not have influenced the jury to convict Ciccone of
first-degree murder without sufficient evidence, particularly since the jury could
have believed conviction of a lesser offense would be adequate to give
Kathleen's "life meaning" and "her death the sense of justice that it requires."
Because Ciccone's claims of prosecutorial misconduct raised for the first
time on appeal do not constitute error, much less fundamental error, he is not
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entitled to relief. Ciccone is likewise not entitled to relief on the single claim of
prosecutorial misconduct he did preserve for appeal because, to the extent the
prosecutor's comments were improper, any potential prejudice was addressed
by the court's curative instruction.

IV.
Ciccone Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of The District Court's Sentencing
Discretion
A.

Introduction
The district court imposed a fixed life sentence upon Ciccone's conviction

for the first degree murder of his wife, Kathleen, and a concurrent fixed 15-year
sentence upon his conviction for the second degree murder of the fetus Kathleen
was carrying when she died.

(R., vol. II, pp.338-41.)

Ciccone does not

challenge the reasonableness of the fixed 15-year sentence in relation to his
second degree murder conviction.

He argues, however, that the fixed life

sentence imposed upon his conviction for first degree murder "is excessive given
any view of the facts." (Appellant's brief, p.46 (emphasis added).) In addition to

applying the incorrect legal standard - the correct standard is whether the
sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts - the arguments
Ciccone advances in support of his claim also fail to establish an abuse of
discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
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The sentence imposed by a trial court is reviewed for a clear abuse of
discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576,577,38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing
State v. Zaitseva, 135 Idaho 11, 13 P.3d 338 (2000».
C.

Ciccone Has Failed To Establish That The Fixed Life Sentence Imposed
Upon His Conviction For The First Degree Murder Of His Pregnant Wife Is
Excessive Under Any Reasonable View Of The Facts
Ciccone was convicted, after a ten-day jury trial, of first degree murder.

(R., vol. II, pp.286-89.) The victim, Ciccone's wife, was only 22 years old and
was 11 weeks pregnant when Ciccone deliberately ran her down with his car.
(PSI, p.19.)

Despite the fact that the jury found Ciccone guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt of intentionally, and with premeditation, murdering Kathleen,
Ciccone has never accepted responsibility nor expressed any remorse for the
criminality of his actions. Ciccone's character, together with the egregiousness
of the offense, his history of violence and his lack of rehabilitative potential, all
support the district court's sentencing determination that society deserves to be
protected from Ciccone for the rest of his natural life.
The applicable legal standards for reviewing a sentencing court's exercise
of discretion are well established. Where, a sentence is within statutory limits,
the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of
discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614,615 (2001) (citing
State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000». To carry this burden the
appellant must show that the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view
of the facts.

Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 38 P.3d at 615.

A sentence is

reasonable, however, if it appears necessary to achieve the primary objective of
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protecting society or any of the related sentencing goals of deterrence,
rehabilitation or retribution. Baker, 136 Idaho at 577,38 P.3d at 615.
First degree murder is punishable by a maximum allowable sentence of
fixed life imprisonment.

I.C. § 18-4004.

Because the fixed life sentence

imposed upon Ciccone's conviction is within the statutory limit, Ciccone bears
the burden on appeal of showing that his sentence is excessive.
Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 604, 768 P.2d 1331, 1337 (1989).

State v.

On appeal, the

question before this Court is not what sentence it would have imposed, but
rather, whether the district court abused its discretion. State v. Stevens, 146
Idaho 139, 148-49, 191 P.3d 217, 226-27 (2008) (citing State v. Toohill, 103
Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982».

Although Ciccone's

sentence is unquestionably weighty, he has not demonstrated from the record
any abuse of discretion in the district court's determination that a fixed life term
of imprisonment was not only warranted, but also necessary, under the facts of
this case.
The Idaho Court of Appeals has "cautioned" that a fixed life sentence
"should be regarded as a sentence requiring a high degree of certainty certainty that the nature of the crime demands incarceration until the perpetrator
dies in prison, or certainty that the perpetrator never, at any time in his life, could
be safely released.'" State v. Perez, 145 Idaho 383, 388, 179 P.3d 346, 351 (Ct.
App. 2008) (quoting State v. Eubank, 114 Idaho 635, 638, 759 P.2d 926, 929
(Ct. App. 1988». This "high degree of certainty" is generally satisfied where "the
offense is so egregious that it demands an exceptionally severe measure of
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retribution and deterrence, or if the offender so utterly lacks rehabilitative
potential that imprisonment until death is the only feasible means of protecting
society."

kL. (emphasis added). Although Ciccone argues otherwise, the record

clearly shows the existence of both of these circumstances in this case.
The egregiousness of Ciccone's offense was established at trial through
physical evidence and the testimony of several witnesses who were either at the
scene when Kathleen died or who responded to and investigated the scene
shortly after her death. Before Ciccone hit Kathleen with his car, a neighbor
heard him revving his engine and peeling out. (Trial Tr., p.722, L.13 - p.723,
L.7.) He raced down the dirt road at a speed at or near 50 miles per hour and,
without braking or attempting to maneuver his vehicle,' plowed the car into
Kathleen, causing her to strike her head on the car and then fly into the air,
through a fence and, ultimately, land against a tree 75 feet away from the point
of impact.

(State's Exhibit 51.)

Kathleen suffered multiple massive skull

fractures and she and her unborn child died at the scene. (Trial Tr., p.563, L.23
- p.565, L.21, p.576, L.21 - p.577, L.14, p.603, L.18 - p.604, L.4, p.664, L.25p.667, L.10, p.1309, Ls.1-24.)
Although he had just run over his pregnant wife, Ciccone only applied his
brakes in an unsuccessful attempt to miss a mailbox on the side of the road.
(State's Exhibit 51.) By the time Ciccone stopped and got out of his vehicle,
Darlene Shaw, the owner of the property on which Kathleen's body landed, had
already rushed to Kathleen's aid. (Trial Tr., p.506, L.25 - p.509, L.19, p.511, L.9
- p.515, L.12.)

Ciccone was very composed; he peered from a distance at
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Kathleen's body and then made a call on his cell phone, but not to 911. (Trial
Tr., p.515, L.23 - p.517, L.20.) As Ciccone was walking away, Ms. Shaw heard
him say, "I got the job done." (Trial Tr., p.518, Ls.8-10.) Ms. Shaw implored
Ciccone to come back, but he refused and continued walking down the road
away from the scene. (Trial Tr., p.518, L.16 -p.519, L.11.)
Ms. Shaw and her daughter contacted 911, and paramedics and law
enforcement were dispatched to the scene. (Trial Tr., p.635, L.3 - p.638, L.13,
p.639, Ls.11-23.) Alan Roberts was the first person to respond. Approximately
one-quarter mile before he reached the crash site, Mr. Roberts observed
Ciccone walking down the road the opposite direction. (Trial Tr., p.598, L.10 p.599, L.18.) Mr. Roberts made three attempts to talk to Ciccone. (Trial Tr.,
p.599, L.19 - p.600, L.12.) The first time, Ciccone did not respond; the second
time, he waved Mr. Roberts off; the third time, he responded, "she needs your
help worse than I do," and kept walking away from the scene. (Trial Tr., p.599,
L.19 - p.601, L.16, p.627, LsA-9.)

Law enforcement and rescue personnel

subsequently found Ciccone in the desert about a mile and a half away. (Trial
Tr., p. 609, L.1 - p.611, L.19, p.669, L.6 - p.671, L.22, p.992, L.18 - p.993, L.3,
p.1165, Ls.8-13, p.1179, Ls.14-16, p.1311, L.18 - p.1313, L.11.) He claimed to
have blacked out, but a CT scan and physical examination detected head
trauma or other abnormalities. (Trial Tr., p.614, Ls.5-12, p.672, L.5 - p.677, L.8,
p.683, L.22 - p.684, L.22, p.1166, L.5 - p.1167, LA, p.1170, L.10 - p.1178,
L.13, p.1181, L.16 - p.1182, L.9, p.1318, L.5 - p.1329, L.2.)

He also made

statements that indicated he was feigning his claimed amnesia. (PSI, p.3.)
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Throughout the proceedings in this case Ciccone claimed that Kathleen's
death was an accident, caused by his careless driving. As set forth above,
however, the physical evidence and Ciccone's bizarre behavior overwhelmingly
established that Ciccone deliberately ran Kathleen down. Ciccone's continued
claim on appeal that Kathleen's death was an accident is simply not bome out by
the evidence and is directly contrary to the jury's findings of fact.
Ciccone asks this Court to ignore the egregiousness of the offense and
focus instead on his potential for rehabilitation, which he claims is demonstrated
by his family support, military service and lack of a prior criminal record.
(Appellant's brief, pp.49-52.)

He also asks this Court to consider his mental

condition as a mitigating factor that militates against the fixed life sentence
imposed upon his conviction for first degree murder. (Appellant's brief, pp.5261.) Contrary to Ciccone's assertions, however, none of these factors renders
his fixed life sentence unreasonable.
Although Ciccone has the support of his family, has served in the military
and has no prior criminal record, he is not the upstanding, compassionate man
of generally good character that he portrays himself to be. Rather, in looking at
the presentence report, including the materials submitted by members of his own
family, it is clear Ciccone has always had an explosive temper.

In a letter

attached to the presentence report, Ciccone's sister wrote: "Frustration, anger,
hurt, loneliness, depression, sorrow, pain, boredom, all of those emotions
seemed to come out in fits of rage in both men in our family, my dad and my
brother."

(PSI, p.13.)

Ciccone's ex-wife stated that Ciccone was "very
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controlling, closed and jealous" and was "physically abusive throughout their
marriage." (PSI, p.15.) She estimated Ciccone "hit her once a month or at least
once every other month during their entire marriage." (PSI, p.15.)
The foregoing accounts are also entirely consistent with Ciccone's
treatment of Kathleen.

According to witnesses, Ciccone was controlling and

jealous and he verbally and physically abused Kathleen. (Trial Tr., p.1211, L.18
- p.1212, L.19, p.1247, L.5 - p.1249, L.3, p.1350, L.4 - p.1353, L.1, p.1354,
Ls.2-4, p.1357, L.25 - p.1358, L.25.) He had previously attempted to run her
over (Trial Tr., p.1949, Ls.3-7) and, on the day she died, there was evidence at
the scene that suggested Ciccone had instigated a physical confrontation with
her. Thus, despite Ciccone's claims to the contrary, his act of callously running
Kathleen down and leaving her and her unborn baby to die was entirely
consistent with his character.
Ciccone also asks this Court to consider "his fragile mental state" as a
factor mitigating against the life sentence he received. (Appellant's brief, p.52.)
He notes that he has a family history of mental illness and that he himself
attempted to commit suicide and claims, in light of this, that mental illness must
have had a central role in the commission of the offense.
p.58.)

(Appellant's brief,

Ciccone fails to point out, however, that although he specifically

requested and received a psychological evaluation at public expense (R., vol. II,
pp.332-33; 3/21/05 Tr., p.73, Ls.9-24), he chose not to utilize the information
gleaned from that evaluation for the purposes of sentencing (Trial Tr., p.1880,
L.12 - p.1882, L.1), thus depriving the district court of any opportunity to
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evaluate the nature and extent of Ciccone's mental condition andlor his
amenability to treatment. Instead, he asks this Court for the first time on appeal
to conclude his sentence is excessive simply because of his family history of
mental illness and his own prior suicide attempt. There is no evidence, however,
that he in fact has a mental illness or that his suicide attempt was the result of
such an illness, as opposed merely to attention-seeking behavior, a scenario
which is entirely plausible given the evidence of his volatile relationship with
Kathleen and his desire to control her.
The district court considered all the information before it, applied the
correct legal standards and correctly determined the appropriate sentence in
light of the egregious nature of the offense and Ciccone's character, which
shows him to be utterly lacking in rehabilitative potential. The sentence imposed
was not only warranted, but also necessary to achieve the primary sentencing
objective of protecting society.

Ciccone has failed to carry his burden of

establishing that the sentencing court abused its discretion.

V.
Ciccone Has Failed To Establish A Violation Of His
Due Process Rights On Appeal
After the appellate record in this case was settled, Ciccone sought and
received one suspension of the briefing schedule to augment the record with
missing transcripts and three extensions of time in which to file his Appellant's
brief. (10/11/07 Motion to Augment and Suspend; 12/21107 Order Granting In
part And Denying In Part Motion To Augment and Suspending Briefing Schedule;
412/08 Motion For Extension Of Time; 4/30108 Order Granting Extension Of
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nd

Time; 5/5/08 Motion for Second Extension of Time; 5/6/08 Order Granting 2

Extension of Time; 6/11/08 Motion For Third Extension of Time; 6/12/08 Order
Re: Appellant's Brief.) On the day Ciccone's brief was due to be filed on third
extension, Ciccone's appellate counsel filed another motion to suspend the
briefing schedule, this time to augment the record with a transcript of the last day
of Ciccone's ten-day trial - the final day of the jury's deliberations during which
there arose an allegation of juror misconduct. (6/18/08 Motion To Augment And
Suspend.)

The Idaho Supreme Court granted the motion to augment and

ordered preparation and lodging of the missing transcript by July 30, 2008.
(7/9/08 Order To Augment Record And Reset The Briefing Schedule.)

The

Court denied Ciccone's request for suspension of the briefing schedule,
however, and ordered Ciccone to file his opening brief by July 16, 2008. (Id.)
The Court's order specifically provided "that if augmentation of the [missing
transcriptj raises a new issue, counsel can move to file a supplemental brief."
(Id.)
Ciccone lodged his Appellant's brief with the Idaho Supreme Court on July
25, 2008, and it was filed on August 27, 2008.

(8/27/08 notice of Appellant's

Brief Filed.) In his brief Ciccone claims that, by requiring him to file his brief prior
to the receipt of the transcript of the last day of his trial, the Idaho Supreme Court
violated his right to due process on appeal. Specifically, he contends that the
Court's order "foreclosed any possibility of raising potentially-meritorious issues
relating to the above-referenced juror misconduct."
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(Appellant's brief, p.63.)

There is no question that, to comport with due process, the state is
"required to provide an indigent defendant a record on appeal that is sufficient for
adequate appellate review of the errors alleged regarding the proceedings
below." State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 462, 50 P.3d 472, 477 (2002) (citing
Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477
(1963); Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. of Prison Terms and Paroles, 357 U.S.
214 (1958); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)).

In this case, the Idaho

Supreme Court ordered preparation of the missing transcript and specifically
afforded Ciccone the opportunity, after he received the transcript, to seek leave
to file a supplemental brief to address any issues arising therefrom.

The

supplemental transcript was filed with the Idaho Supreme Court on September
10, 2008. (9/10/08 notice of filing of supplemental transcript.) That Ciccone's
appellate counsel has not, to this day, sought leave to file a supplemental brief
based upon information contained in the new transcript does not establish a
violation of Ciccone's due process rights on appeal.

47

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court dismiss Ciccone's appeal
or, in the alternative, affirm Ciccone's conviction and sentence.
DATED this 19th day of November 2008.
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